A beautiful celebration of your child's uniqueness among all of God's creation, this colorful picture book by Cleere Cherry Reaves speaks the words on your heart about what a God-given miracle your little one will always be.

Digital manipulation of photographs raises a different set of questions for magazine editors than it does for news.paper editors. Interviews with editors of 13 consumer magazines reveal that digital alteration depends largely on the editorial profile of the magazine. All editors interviewed refused to digitally manipulate news photos; however, opinions varied on the treatment of feature and cover photos.

In this book, Kevin M. Cherry compares the views of Aristotle and Plato about the practice, study, and above all, the purpose of politics.

In Roper v. Simmons (2005) the United States Supreme Court announced a paradigm shift in jurisprudence. Drawing specifically on mounting scientific evidence that adolescents are qualitatively different from adults in their decision-making capacities, the Supreme Court recognized that adolescents are not adults in all but age. The Court concluded that the overwhelming weight of the psychological and neurophysiological data regarding brain maturation supports the conclusion that adolescents are qualitatively different types of agents than adult persons. The Supreme Court further solidified (...) its position regarding adolescents as less than fully mature and responsible decisionmakers in Graham v. Florida (2010) and Miller v. Alabama (2012). In each case, the Court concluded that the scientific evidence does not support the conclusion that children under 18 years of age possess adult capacities for personal agency, rationality, and mature choice. This study explores the implications of the Supreme Court decisions in Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama for the “mature minor” standard for medical decision making. It argues that the Supreme Court’s holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller require no less than a radical reassessment of how healthcare institutions, courts of law, and public policy are obliged to regard minors as medical decisionmakers. The “mature minor” standard for medical decision making must be abandoned. (shrink)

This study seeks to advance the understanding of controversy resolution in science. I take as a case study conceptualization and treatment of ulcer disease. Analysis of causal accounts and effective treatments illustrate the ways in which competing parallel research programs in medicine embody opposing social, political, and economic forces which are bound to the epistemological dimensions of scientific controversy (e.g., standards of evidence, reference, and inference), and which in turn shift perception of the burden of proof. The analysis illustrates the (...) ways in which (1) medical diagnoses create as much as discover useful distinctions and (2) epistemic and non epistemic values divide scientists into competing research programs, as well as (3) the ways in which these structures often effectively prevent scientific controversy closure. (shrink)

This study is concerned with the moral dilemma that stems from the digital manipulation of magazine ads to render models thinner. Exposure to the "thin ideal" has been linked to such damaging psychological responses as body dissatisfaction, loss of self-esteem, and ultimately to disordered eating behaviors. However, the artistic freedom of photo editors is a cherished value that conflicts with the concern for public health. Findings suggest that, although aware of the prevalence of digital editing, readers disapprove of its use (...) in rendering models thinner, and judge it to be unethical and unfair. Findings are discussed with regard to the role of education in helping readers discount manipulated images. (shrink)

A book on human communication that is worthy of its subject must introduce the reader to the dynamic interaction of a number of diverse fields. Colin Cherry's book, over successive editions, has served for twenty years as perhaps the most literate and readable introduction to this interaction available. Readers have consistently found that fields within their specialty are covered with authority; that fields far removed are covered with clarity; and that the connections among them are shown to be close (...) and natural. This third edition includes a new chapter, "Feeling, Knowledge, and Understanding," that extends the book's reach into philosophy, and in particular communicates some existential points-of-view. In it the author undertakes to demonstrate that "The language of physical science is inadequate for discussion of what is essentially human about human communication." In addition, numerous changes have been introduced throughout the text, and the bibliography has been expanded and updated. (shrink)

The new computer technology that dramatically improves color reproduction in newspapers also allows digital retouching of photographs. Digital retouching can alter and synthesize photos to the point that the alteration is undetectable. This technology gives publications the ability to create eye?catching illustrations, but does it have a place in photojournalism? This paper attempts to raise some initial ethical questions. Although manipulation of photographs is not new, digital retouching allows for imperceptible alterations of photographs to be made with speed, ease, and (...) precision. All the editors agreed that news photographs should not be altered. However, there was disagreement about photographs that appeared in the feature sections, in particular photo illustrations. (shrink)

IT SEEMS PLAUSIBLE TO DIVIDE ALLEGEDLY EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS, "SECULAR" OR OTHERWISE, INTO TWO BROAD CATEGORIES. THE FIRST CATEGORY COMPRISES EVENTS WHICH APPEAR TO BE EXTENSIONS OF THE FAMILIAR, SINCE THEIR CHARACTERIZATION APPARENTLY INCORPORATE A REFERENCE TO EVENTS WHICH ARE SCIENTIFICALLY COMMONPLACE. THE SECOND COMPRISES EVENTS WHICH APPEAR TO BE TOTAL BREAKS WITH THE FAMILIAR, SINCE APPARENTLY NO SUCH REFERENCES CAN BE ELICITED. THE WRITER EXAMINES IN DETAIL POSSIBLE BASES FOR THE DISTINCTION, IN CONNECTION, ESPECIALLY, WITH THE NOTION OF THE DEFEASIBILITY (...) OF AN ACTION. HE CONCLUDES THAT ALTHOUGH THE DISTINCTION CANNOT IN THE END BE SUSTAINED, ANY ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE A COHERENT LOGIC OF THE MIRACULOUS MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF A NUMBER OF POINTS ARISING FROM THE EXAMINATION. (shrink)

The Moral Psychology of Anger is the first comprehensive study of the moral psychology of anger from a philosophical perspective. The collection provides an inclusive view of anger from a variety of philosophical perspectives.

The cities of refuge as detailed in the Deuteronomic witness in the Hebrew Bible have served as the inspiration and model for the practice of providing sanctuary for many throughout the centuries, namely with the most recent Sanctuary movements in the US and the UK in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. And yet, its biblical witness as to its implementation and effectiveness is practically silent. Using methods of biblical studies via liberation hermeneutics and theological ethics from both the Jewish and (...) Christian traditions, the following questions will be explored: What were the cities of refuge? How were they to be set up? What are the theological and ethical questions at play in the biblical witness as to their use? What relevance, if any, do they have for us today? (shrink)

Bioethics functions within a world of deep moral pluralism; a universe of discourse debating ethical analysis, public policy, and clinical practice in which a common, generally accepted morality does not exist. While religious thinkers are often approached within a hermeneutic of suspicion for assuming moral standards that cannot be justified in rational terms, secular bioethicists routinely find themselves in exactly the same intellectual predicament. That ethical theory, proposed values, or normative content is secular, that it does not invoke God or (...) any particular religious perspective, does not mean that it is rationally grounded, necessarily true, or universally binding. As the authors in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy make clear, this normative reality directly impacts debates regarding concepts of health, illness, and disease, accounts of socially acceptable health-risky behaviors, and the political frameworks that shape public policy. As a result, honest discussion of diverse moral, religious, and political perspectives remains essential in clarifying the intellectual challenges, ethical intuitions, and ideological judgments that shape clinical practice and healthcare policy. Depending on which moral, political, or scientific concepts are guiding bioethical analysis, careful scrutiny will tend to support rather different policies and practices, each of which is likely to be worth careful consideration. (shrink)

This study applies evolution theory to visual ethics and argues that social comparison theory favored by scholars of eating disorders is actually a Darwinian maladaptation to the media's widespread digital manipulation of women's bodies creating the thin ideal. An evolutionary perspective suggests how the media is enmeshed and why social comparison of the mediated ?mono-body? will continue. This study has three sections: 1) evolution theory and morality; 2) social comparison, biology of the social gaze, and anthropological evidence of Western media's (...) role in the global rise of eating disorders; and 3) rethinking visual ethics to expand Newton's (2001) mass interpersonal relationship. (shrink)

When it comes to injustice, especially racial injustice, rage isn't just an acceptable response-it's crucial in order to fuel the fight for change. Anger has a bad reputation. Many people think that it is counterproductive, distracting, and destructive. It is a negative emotion, many believe, because it can lead so quickly to violence or an overwhelming fury. And coming from people of color, it takes on connotations that are even more sinister, stirring up stereotypes, making white people fear what an (...) angry other might be capable of doing, when angry, and leading them to turn to hatred or violence in turn, to squelch an anger that might upset the racial status quo. According to philosopher Myisha Cherry, anger does not deserve its bad reputation. It is powerful, but its power can be a force for good. And not only is it something we don't have to discourage, it's something we ought to cultivate actively. People fear anger because they paint it in broad strokes, but we can't dismiss all anger, especially not now. There is a form of anger that in fact is crucial in the anti-racist struggle today. This anti-racist anger, what Cherry calls Lordean rage, can use its mighty force to challenge racism: it aims for change, motivates productive action, builds resistance, and is informed by an inclusive and liberating perspective. People can, and should, harness Lordean rage and tap into its unique anti-racist potential. We should not suppress it or seek to replace it with friendly emotions. If we want to effect change, and take down racist structures and systems, we must manage it in the sense of cultivating it, and keeping it focused and strong. Cherry makes her argument for anti-racist anger by putting Aristotle in conversation with Audre Lorde, and James Baldwin in conversation with Joseph Butler. The Case for Rage not only uses the tools of philosophy to articulate its arguments, but it sharpens them with the help of social psychology and history. The book is philosophically rich and yet highly accessible beyond philosophical spheres, issuing an urgent call to all politically and socially engaged readers looking for new, deeply effective tools for changing the world. Its message will resonate with the enraged and those witnessing such anger, wondering whether it can help or harm. Above all, this book is a resource for the activist coming to grips with a seemingly everyday emotion that she may feel rising up within her and not know what to do with. It shows how to make sure anger doesn't go to waste, but instead leads to lasting, long-awaited change. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Influence of Personalism on Harkness and King, Their Pacifism, and Their PersistenceNatalya A. Cherry (bio)I. IntroductionAs it is the hallmark of liberal theologies to take their critics seriously and learn from the criticisms offered, it is important to acknowledge a valid potential criticism of this article at its outset. Rufus Burrow, in God and Human Dignity: The Personalism, Theology, and Ethics of Martin Luther King, Jr., observed (...) that scholarship on King demonstrates a tendency on the part of white scholars to try to use the work of Boston Personalists to claim outsized influence on King.1 Perhaps these tendencies reflect an effort by white scholars to cling to the coattails of King’s massive popularity or to mask our own complicity in white supremacy. This paper therefore refrains from claiming that Georgia Harkness, the first woman appointed a theology professor in an American theological school, had a major, direct influence on King. Rather it identifies Personalist-influenced models of God common to Harkness and King—as a result of their both having studied under Borden Parker Bowne’s student Edgar S. Brightman—that appear to undergird their commitments to nonviolence. It respectfully considers their influences and their models of God, the confluences of their commitments, and the outlook for nonviolence at the ends of their lives, as well as for the present and future, over 55 and 49 years since their respective deaths.II. Evidences of InfluencesTwo pieces of textual evidence demonstrate Harkness’s and King’s mutual respect for one another and offer some insight into their experiences with Boston Personalism. One is an epistolary exchange between the two that includes a letter from King, in which he acknowledged his familiarity with Harkness’s [End Page 57] work.2 Though he did not mention it in this letter, the other piece of textual evidence is his brief reference to an article by Harkness in the third chapter of his doctoral dissertation3 completed at Boston University.4 [End Page 58]The first, epistolary evidence results from the fact that King had received a letter from Harkness as he recuperated from a very nearly successful, apparent assassination attempt carried out on September 20, 1958. The letter from Harkness was dated ten days later, incidentally the same day he publicly forgave his attacker, who was later found to be criminally insane. In her letter, Harkness wished him well, expressed admiration for his work in the civil rights movement and specifically offered her appreciation for his recently published book about the Montgomery Bus Boycott, Stride Toward Freedom. A book-signing for it, in fact, had put him in the path of his attacker in Harlem that September day. In the opening of her letter, Harkness had taken pains to identify herself to him, to which King replied,You needed not take the extra paragraph to introduce yourself to me. I have known you for several years through your writings. When I was a student in theological seminary...I had the great privilege of reading some of your books and articles. When I went to Boston University for my doctoral studies, I naturally heard your name many times, for Boston University, as you know, is very proud of you and never forgets to mention that you are one of its graduates. I have long admired your Christian witness and your sound theology. I hope it will be possible for us to meet personally in the not-too-distant future.5While there does not appear to be a record of whether this hope of meeting in person was ever fulfilled, nor of which of Harkness’s “books and articles” King had read in seminary, there is clear record—in the other textual evidence mentioned above—of his encounter with her work while he studied at Boston.There, his dissertation, “A Comparison of the Conceptions of God in the Thinking of Paul Tillich and Henry Nelson Wieman,” referred his readers to an article Harkness had published in 1938, entitled “The Abyss and the Given.”6 The reference emerges in King’s third chapter, on “Tillich’s conception of God,” where he eventually would describe love and justice as inextricably... (shrink)

When Wet’suwet’en matriarch Freda Huson declared that ‘reconciliation is dead’ and called on supporters to ‘Shut Down Canada’, activists responded with a nationwide series of blockades and occupations. Many commenters, even those sympathetic to the Wet’suwet’en, rushed to defend the idea of reconciliation. Such responses fail to take the contributions this movement offers to decolonial thought seriously. Drawing on interviews with movement participants, I explore what participants mean by reconciliation and what they intend by declaring it dead, showing how participants (...) reject forms of decolonization that center the needs of the settler state. I also explore Land Back as an emerging, grassroots alternative to reconciliation that centers the resurgence of Indigenous governance systems in place of the settler state. Finally I explore settlers’ place within this project and considers its relation to the resurgence school of thought. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

A truly Christian bioethics challenges the nature, substance, and application of secular morality, dividing Christians from non-Christians, accenting central moral differences, and providing content-full forthrightly Christian guidance for action. Consequently, Christian bioethics must be framed within the metaphysical and theological commitments of Traditional Christianity so as to provide proper orientation toward God. In contrast, secular bioethicists routinely present themselves as providing a universal bioethics acceptable to all reasonable and rational persons. Yet, such secular bioethicists habitually insert their own biases and (...) prejudices into their moral conclusions, ethical consultations, and political aspirations, without any real justification. As this article explores, the ideologically driven anti-Christian commitments, including commitments to human rights and social justice, embodied within contemporary bioethics routinely illustrate the increasing gap between the traditionally Christian and the devoutly secular, further deepening the culture wars. (shrink)

Accounts of natural law moral philosophy and theology sought principles and precepts for morality, law, and other forms of social authority, whose prescriptive force was not dependent for validity on human decision, social influence, past tradition, or cultural convention, but through natural reason itself. This volume critically explores and assesses our contemporary culture wars in terms of: the possibility of natural law moral philosophy and theology to provide a unique, content-full, canonical morality; the character and nature of moral pluralism; the (...) limits of justifiable national and international policy seeking to produce and preserve human happiness, social justice, and the common good; the ways in which morality, moral epistemology, and social political reform must be set within the broader context of an appropriately philosophically and theologically anchored anthropology. This work will be of interest to philosophers, theologians, bioethicists, ethicists and political scientists. (shrink)

My ultimate concern is with how it can be that the past, and in particular my past, matters, in broadly non-causal ways, to the present, and in particular my present. How can it matter to me to have done things, and to remember having done them? However, I take some time to get to this concern, for I believe it should not be there at all, or at any rate take the form it does. So this needs explaining first.

In Book III of A Treatise on Human Nature,' Hume puts two questions which he says are distinct. The first concerns "the manner in which the rules of justice are established by the artifice of men." The second concerns "the reasons which determine us to attribute to the observance or neglect of these rules a moral beauty and deformity." Whatever his sympathies, the reader is bound to be struck by the sustained ingenuity of Hume's answer to the first question. He (...) is likely to be less impressed by the way in which Hume copes with the second. I shall be concerned with certain difficulties in Hume's treatment in the Treatise of this second question-difficulties which are of far more than exegetical interest. However, because the two questions are by no means as distinct as Hume declares-something which is rapidly made evident even by Hume's own discussion-I cannot exclude all reference to the first. What I shall avoid is any attempt to assess what is commonly received as Hume's answer to that question. Furthermore, I say next to nothing about what Hume takes just and unjust behaviour to consist in: about that remarkably confined area of human affairs which for Hume defines the limits within which people may be said to behave justly (and unjustly)-and, of course, to display other parasitic artificial virtues (and vices). My concern is rather with Hume's efforts to explain how there can be as well as natural, artificial virtues; how certain practices, whatever their detailed anatomies and inter-connexions, can be found morally estimable. And my conclusion is that his efforts are bound to fail. (shrink)

Secular bioethics fails to grasp the central moral and spiritual realities of medicine. As the authors in this issue of Christian Bioethics argue, contemporary healthcare practice is often based on the false premise that medical science can secure the safety of human life. Yet, the standard “biopsychosocial model” of medicine fails to grasp the theological dimensions of healthcare often harming patients and their families in the process. Indeed, as the articles explore, all too often secular bioethics manipulates medicine to achieve (...) immoral purposes, such as active euthanasia of the sick or elderly. Such spiritual decay is acutely manifested in the pressure put on patients to accept an economically efficient and medically expedient assisted death as well as in how society often treats the human body as mere res—a thing unimportant in itself apart from animation as a living person. Together the articles illustrate that without careful religiously grounded advice modern medicine is often spiritually disorienting for both patients and practitioners. (shrink)

In this paper, I seek to describe the ‘other’ harms and forms of wrongdoing that an affective stereotype with specific racial and gender content, has. I will focus on the “Angry Black Woman” stereotype (or ABW stereotype), and I will reveal its intrinsic and direct extrinsic harms. I’ll then argue that it is a stereotype threat prime whose harm as an ‘affective injustice’ can cause agents to underperform on real-life affective, social, and political tasks. I also think prescriptively with Black (...) feminist Audre Lorde about stereotype threat and how to respond to it. In doing so, I hope to contribute to the conversation that began with Larry Blum by expanding the harms that stereotypes inflict, particularly affective stereotypes of marginalized groups. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a view beyond that which would narrowly reduce the role of parents in medical decision making to acting as custodians of the best interests of children and toward an account of family authority and family autonomy. As a fundamental social unit, the good of the family is usually appreciated, at least in part, in terms of its ability successfully to instantiate its core moral and cultural understandings as well as to pass on such commitments to (...) future generations. The putative rights of children to expression, information, freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and to freedom of association with others are, in this essay, assessed from the perspective of those conditions necessary for the family to function as a moral community. In so doing, I respond to the move to liberate children from parental authority and to effect the transformation of the family as implied by the United Nations’ "Convention on the Rights of the Child" and the pediatric bioethics it supports. (shrink)

I begin, as I shall end, with fictions.In a well-known tale, The Sandman, Hoffmann has a student, Nathaniel, fall in love with a beautiful doll, Olympia, whom he has spied upon as she sits at a window across the street from his lodgings. We are meant to suppose that Nathaniel mistakes an automaton for a human being. The mistake is the result of an elaborate but obscure deception on the part of the doll's designer, Professor Spalanzani. Nathaniel is disabused quite (...) by accident when he over-hears a quarrel between Spalanzani, who made Olympia's clockwork, and the sinister Coppelius, who contributed the eyes. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess Peter Dabrock's “Drawing distinctions responsibly and concretely: A European Protestant perspective on foundational theological bioethics.” I explore the ways in which Dabrock announces nontraditional Christian assumptions to guide Christian bioethics, engages the secular bioethical agenda on the very terms set by and congenial to the field of secular bioethics, and searches for insights from philosophy and science through which to recast Christian moral judgments. For example, he cites approvingly, as if they were expressive of Christian (...) moral concerns: human rights, democracy, and state-based social redistribution of resources to satisfy welfare entitlements. In this short essay, I argue that Dabrock has unduly limited the role of Traditional Christian theology to guide bioethics and, consequently, has also wrongly characterized the Christian moral life and Christian social/political obligations. (shrink)